Find the perfect sub game nash equilibrium, Game Theory

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Suppose that the incumbent monopolist, in the previous question, can decide (before anything else happens) to make an irreversible investment in extra Capacity (C), or Not (N). If it does so invest, there is an additional fixed cost of $4m to the incumbent monopolist, whether or not the extra capacity is used. The only time that the extra capacity would get used is if the monopolist decides to fight the entrant: it will then make a profit of £2m (which is inclusive of the cost of the extra capacity), instead of £0m because the existence of the extra capacity will make it cheaper to flood the market. Player P's payoffs remain unchanged. In this case, denote the strategy set for P as {E, S} and that for M as {C, N, A, F} : Find the perfect sub game Nash Equilibrium, now, typing your answer as either (C, S) , (C,E, F) , (C,E,A) , (N, S) , (N,E, F) or (N;E;A) ; but remember the brackets, commas, upper case letters, AND no spaces.


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