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a) Define the term Nash equilibrium
b) You are given the following pay-off matrix:
Strategies for player 1
Strategies for player 2
L
C
R
T
2,0
1,1
4,2
M
3,4
1,2
2,3
B
1,3
0,2
3,0
i) What strategies survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies?
ii) What are the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of this game?
c) A Cournot duopoly has a demand function of the form p (Q)=a-Q and faces a marginal cost C>0 where a>c . Determine the profit maximizing output for each firm and the optimal price.
d) If the two firms in (a) were to merge to form a monopoly, what would be the profit-maximizing output and the corresponding price? Compare both the output and price under Cournot and monopolist.
mixed strategy game with ordinal and cardinal payoffs example please
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