Solve the iterated strict dominance

Assignment Help Management Theories

Reference no: EM131449706

Question: Consider an arbitrary two-player game with action spaces A₁= A₂= [0,1] and payoff functions that are twice continuously differentiable and concave in own action. Say that the game is locally solvable by iterated strict dominance at a* if there is a rectangle N containing a* such that when players are restricted to choosing actions in N, the successive elimination of strictly dominated strategies vields the unique point a*. Relate the conditions for local solvability by iterated strict dominance of the simultaneous-move process to those for local stability of the alternating-move Cournot adjustment process. (The answer is in Gabay and Moulin 1980).

Reference no: EM131449706

Questions Cloud

Construct a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium : Consider a simultaneous-move auction in which two players simultaneously choose bids, which must be in nonnegative integer multiples of one cent.

Algorithm using java programming language : Design a dynamic programming algorithm to find the value of the optimal plan. Implement your algorithm using JAVA programming language.

Change in a government impacts the oil industry : Explain why or why not - using 3-4 examples to support your opinion. Also include how the change in a government impacts the oil industry with 1 example.

Describe a little about the fsa program : Describe a little about the FSA program.Find a social documentary photograph from an FSA photographer that youResearch the social realists who worked.

Solve the iterated strict dominance : Consider an arbitrary two-player game with action spaces A1 = A2 = [0,1] and payoff functions that are twice continuously differentiable and concave in own.

Discuss the impact of the local community or local culture : SOC 2010 : How does the place of interest impact the local community or local culture in a positive and or negative way (tourism? recreation? jobs? beauty?

Evaluate the plan in terms of market incentives : Evaluate this plan in terms of market incentives, one of the ten principles of economics, to work and current welfare programs.

Justify the cournot game : Show that in the Cournot game with three Nash equilibria with the reaction curves depicted in figure

Confidence interval for the population mean customer : State the null and the alternative hypothesis for this test. Calculate the value of the test statistic for this test.

User Account

All Pages