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A two-player game is symmetric if the two players have the same strategy set S1 = S2 and the payoff functions satisfy u1(s1, s2) = u2(s2, s1) for each s1, s2 ∈ S1.
Prove that the set of equilibria of a two-player symmetric game is a symmetric set: if (s1, s2) is an equilibrium, then (s2, s1) is also an equilibrium.
Consider the following two-person, zero-sum game. Payoffs are the winnings for Player A. Identify the pure strategy solution. What is the value of the game?
Carleton Chemical claims that they can produce more than 800 tons of meladone on average per week. A random sample of 36 weeks of production yields the following results.
Download a shareware version of some commercial software. Design a plan for converting the shareware version to a full version without paying one cent.
Next suppose that the game being played is the battle of the sexes. In the long run, as the game is played over and over, does play always settle down to a Nash equilibrium? Explain.
Suppose that there is a payoff-irrelevant event that has a probability e of occurring before this game is played and that, if it occurred, would be observed by players 1 and 3 but not by player 2.
If each group had 15 officers, how would you characterize the performance of the typical officer in each squad?
Suppose n = 11. Does this game have a Nash equilibrium? If so, describe an equilibrium and explain how many Nash equilibria there are.
If player 1 is not type ß, then what probability would player 1 assign to the event that a letter sent by player 1 was lost in the mail? Show that there is no Bayesian equilibrium of this game in which player 2 ever chooses x2.
Bayesian game - Solve for an Nash equilibrium of this game and show that there is always an equilibrium where the sender plays the same action after every message
What is the present value of a perpetuity that begins payment 10 years from today. The first payment is $1000.
Compare the people's comfort in the equilibria of the two games. Suppose that each person cares only about her own comfort. Model the situation as a strategic game. Is this game the Prisoner's Dilemma?
Compute and describe the Nash equilibria of the following static bargaining game. - Simultaneously and independently, players 1 and 2 make demands m1 and m2.
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