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Let (N; v) be a coalitional game satisfying the following property: there is an imputation x ∈ X(N; v) such that all the excesses at x are nonnegative.
(a) Prove that x is the only imputation in the game, and in particular it is the nucleolus.
(b) Is x necessarily also the prenucleolus? Either prove this statement, or provide a counterexample.
Suppose that you do a test for H0: μ = 6 against HA: μ &neq; 6 you obtain a sample mean of 6.5 and the test gives you a a p-value of 6%. We want to connect the p-value to the confidence interval for the mean.
where time is measured in months and 0
State a conclusion about the null hypothesis-reject Ho or fail to reject Ho. State a final conclusion-non-technical that addresses the original claim.
What are the ingredients of a simultaneous-move game? Show (using simple examples) how one might propose a "solution" for such games. Comment on the strengths and weaknesses of your solution concept(s).
You are using the Durbin-Watson statistic to discover whether the value of your dependent variable at time t is related to its value at the previous time period.
In a study to estimate the portion of residents in a certain city and its suburbs who favor the construction of a nuclear power plant, it is found that 63 of 100 urban residents favor the construction while only 59 of 125 suburban residents are in..
In the following two-player zero-sum game, find the optimal behavior strategies of the two players. (Why must such strategies exist?)
a) what is the probability that a randomly selected scooter passed inspection? b) what is the probability that if a randomly selected scooter did not pass inspection, it came from assembly line B?
Find all Nash equilibria in pure strategies in the following non-zero-sum games. Describe the steps that you used in finding the equilibria.
Prove that in a simple game satisfying the property that v(S) + v(N \ S) = 1 for every coalition S ⊆ N, there exists at most one veto player, and that player is a dictator.
Describe an example of the Public Key Infrastructure that would explain the differing usages of symmetric and asymmetric encryption and how these encryption methods might use either a substitution or a transposition cipher.
Show that army 2 can increase its subgame perfect equilibrium payoff (and reduce army 1's payoff) by burning the bridge to its mainland, eliminating its option to retreat if attacked.
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