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(a) How many different coalitional structures can there be in a three-player game? Write down all of them.
(b) How many different coalitional structures can there be in a four-player game? Write down all of them.
Does this game have a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium? If so, describe it. If not, explain why. - describe a mixed-strategy equilibrium of this game. Explain whether people obey the law.
Critical Thinking: Suppose you and a friend each take different random samples of data pairs (x,y) from the sample population. Assume the samples are the same size.
In a two player, one shot simultaneous move game each player can select strategy A or B. If both players select strategy A, each receives a payoff of $500.
where time is measured in months and 0
Find an example of a belief space where the set of players consists of two players, and there exists an inconsistent state of the world ω at which πi({ω} | ω) = 0.
Explain why the threatened action is not automatically credible, given your payoff structure. Explain why the implied promise is automatically credible.
What region(s) did you select as trading partner(s), and why? Mutual benefits form the basis for nations to engage in international trade, and how could one track mutual benefit from this simulation?
Is it still true that each player bidding his valuation is a weakly dominant strategy? - Are there other Nash equilibria of this game?
Calculate the reliability over a 37 hour period and what is the steady state availability of the system.
At a 0.025 significance level using the critical value approach, test to see if the % error is higher than the industry standard. Clearly state your hypothesis and conclusions.
What is firm 2's optimal quantity as a function of q1, conditional on entry? - Compute the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game.
A firm incurs production costs C(q) = F + mq, and transportation costs T(q) = aq + ????2, where q is the output of each of its plants. What is the optimal plant size, and how does it vary with the parameters F, m, a and b?
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