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Consider a two-player non-zero-sum game on the unit square in which Player I's strategy set is X = [0, 1], Player II's strategy set is Y = [0, 1], and the payoff functions for the players are given below.
Find the maxmin value and the maxmin strategy (or strategies) of the players. Does this game have an equilibrium? If so, find it.
(a) u(x,y) = 1 + 4x + y - 5xy.
(b) u(x,y) = 4 + 2y - 4xy.
In the game of roulette, a player can place a $8 bet on the number 33 and have a 1/38 probability of winning. If the metal ball lands on 33, the player gets to keep the $8 paid to play the game and the player is awarded an additional $280.
How many twbgames are then: in this game (excluding the game itself)? b. Write down the strategies of the two players. c. Find all pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilania.
What is her payoff if she deviates to a lower or higher effort level? Is any action profile in which not all the players' effort levels are the same a Nash equilibrium?
Joseph Schumpeter said that "perfect competition is not only impossible, but inferior, and has no title to being set up as a model of ideal efficiency." What does this statement say to you?
If player 1 is not type ß, then what probability would player 1 assign to the event that a letter sent by player 1 was lost in the mail? Show that there is no Bayesian equilibrium of this game in which player 2 ever chooses x2.
Suppose n = 11. Does this game have a Nash equilibrium? If so, describe an equilibrium and explain how many Nash equilibria there are.
Determine whether this game has a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in which each player selects X with probability p. If you can find such an equilibrium, what is p?
Your firm has determined that if the average household salary in a geographic area is greater than $53000, then their product will be successful.
PSC/ECO 288 Game Theory Assignment. Is war avoidable in equilibrium? Draw a graph with c on the horizontal axis and s on the vertical axis, indicating the region where various offers prevail. What is the two countries' payoff from equilibrium in e..
Determine the solution to the given advertising decision game between Coke and Pepsi, assuming the companies act independently.
Explain why the threatened action is not automatically credible, given your payoff structure. Explain why the implied promise is automatically credible.
A sample set of 29 scores has a mean of 76 and a standard deviation of 7. Can we accept the hypothesis that the sample is a random sample from a population with a mean greater than 72? Use alpha = 0.01(1-tail) in making your decision.
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