Reference no: EM133478424

Strategic counterintelligence deals with protecting our nation's sensitive information from foreign intelligence services as well as exploiting those intelligence services in our favor. Some of the nuance or why the question is raised about a 'renaissance' in Strategic Counterintelligence comes from, in my opinion, two places: The digital, interconnected world economy, and the proliferation of non-state actors (NSA) that seek to bring harm to our country.

Counterintelligence is at its core safeguarding physical security, prevention of spillage, restricting access, and preventing, finding, and stopping leaks or moles. This becomes increasingly difficult as the entire world becomes more connected, and systems reach over boundaries for a myriad of reasons.

Harbor's article addresses the NSA factor and digs into how terrorist organizations benefit from trying to infiltrate U.S. intelligence. While the article mostly mentions what we have come to know as terrorist groups, i.e. Taliban, Al Qaeda, ISIL, the concepts of the article are applicable to groups motivated by things other than religion, as well as proxy groups.

Counterintelligence is vital but can be a double-edged sword. Many of the processes used hinder the operational work of intelligence and make the system slow and clumsy. I do feel the government should be pursuing A robust Strategic Counterintelligence discipline, but great care most be taken in how its structured. This becomes an even greater hurdle as I find fault with how the IC is currently structured.

Many of the same concern of oversight that we discussed weeks back become even more prolific when you start to unpack strategic counterintelligence layered over strategic intelligence.