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Let G = (N , (Si)i∈N , (ui)i∈N) be a game in strategic form, and let G^ be the game derived from G by a process of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
What is the relation between the set of correlated equilibria of G and the set of correlated equilibria of G^? Justify your answer.
Construct payoff functions for the representative voter who prefers candidate A and one who prefers candidate B. In both, VA is the number of voters, other than the representative voter, who vote for candidate - Describe all of the Nash equilibria ..
If an applicant to a university has taken test A and scored 910 and another student has taken test B and scored 33, compare these students score using Z-values. Which one has a higher relative score?
Specify this situation as a strategic game. - Use the symmetry of the game to show that the unique equilibrium payoff of each player is 0.
Suppose we want to design a new placebo-controlled trial to evaluate an experimental medication to increase lung capacity.
Construct the normal form of game assuming consumers move simultaneously and choose between two strategies: "Adopt" or "Don't Adopt." Solve for any (pure strategy) Nash equilibria.
Draw this game's extensive-form tree for k = 5. - Use backward induction to find the subgame perfect equilibrium.- Describe the backward induction outcome of this game for any finite integer k.
Find all the equilibria in the following three-player game, in which Player I chooses a row (T or B), Player II chooses a column (L or R), and Player III chooses a matrix (W or E).
Show that the game that results if player 1 is prohibited from using one of her actions in G does not have an equilibrium in which player 1's payoff is higher than it is in an equilibrium of G.
Recall the trust game depicted in Figure. We argued that for δ ≥ 1/2 the following pair of strategies is a sub game perfect equilibrium.
What is the free market price and quantity of chicken'? What is the wage of the average chicken worker in the free market situation?
Describe this situation as a two-player strategic-form game.- Prove that the only equilibrium in this game is that given by both chains selecting the location x =1/2 .
Find the Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies of the following static game of complete information. For the following base game determine whether or not (2, 1) is an equilibrium payoff of the corresponding infinitely repeated game
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