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Consider the two-person game in strategic form shown in Table 2.
a. Characterize the set of all Nash equilibria of this game.
b. Show that (.5[x1] + .5[z1], [x2]) is not a perfect equilibrium of this game.
c. Which Nash equilibria are perfect?
d. Find a proper equilibrium of the game.
In a one shot game, if you promote and your rival promotes, you will earn $7 million and your rival will earn $2 million in profits.
Critical Thinking: Suppose you and a friend each take different random samples of data pairs (x,y) from the sample population. Assume the samples are the same size.
Draw this game in extensive form. - Using a matrix representation, find all the pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria for this game.
Suppose n = 11. Does this game have a Nash equilibrium? If so, describe an equilibrium and explain how many Nash equilibria there are.
A hat contains three coins - one gold, one silver and one copper. You will select coins one at a time without replacement until you choose the gold coin. The outcome of interest is the sequence of coins that are selected during this process.
Write the matrix representing the induced game and determine whether (I, I) can be enforced. Explain your answer.
A survey of 356 local drivers reveals that 18.7% of them car pool. Is there evidence that the actual proportion of local commuters car-pooling is less than national level. Also find and interpret the p-value of this test.
Find 95% confidence intervals for the proportion of Tyson packages with contamination and the proportion of Perdue packages with contamination (use 3 decimal places in your answers).
Find a Bernoulli payoff function whose expected value represents the decision-maker's preferences and that assigns a payoff of 1 to the best outcome and a payoff of 0 to the worst outcome.
Read the following article "Retail Frenzy: Prices on the Web Change Hourly" By STEPHANIE CLIFFORD and make 2 differant comments briefly on the similarity with Prisoners Dilemma type games that in the attachment Chapter 15.
Find conditions on the discount factor under which cooperation can be supported in the infinitely repeated games with the following stage games.
How much effort do the students exert in the Nash equilibrium of the game introduced by Amalia and what value v for the cake induces the students to exert the efficient effort level?
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