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Answer the following questions for the zero-sum game with incomplete information with two players I and II, in which each player has two types, TI = {I1, I2} and TII = {II1, II2}, the common prior over the type vectors is
p(I1,II1) = 0.4, p(I1, II2) = 0.1, p(I2, II1)= 0.2, p(I2, II2) = 0.3.
(a) List the set of pure strategies of each player.
(b) Depict the game in strategic form.
(c) Calculate the value of the game and find optimal strategies for the two players.
Assume that the market for computer chips is dominated through two comapnies: Intel and AMD. Intel has discovered how to make superior chips and is planning whether or not to adopt new technology.
Draw this game's extensive-form tree for k = 5. - Use backward induction to find the subgame perfect equilibrium.- Describe the backward induction outcome of this game for any finite integer k.
Show this sequential-play game in strategic form, and find all the Nash equilibria. Which is or are subgame perfect and which is or are not? If any are not, explain why.
Consider the two extensive-form games below. Show that (2, 2) is a sequential equilibrium payoff in Game A, but not a sequential equilibrium payoff in Game B.
Describe this situation as an extensive-form game, where the root of the game tree is a chance move that determines whether Caesar is brave or cowardly.
Suppose that the MBA education industry is constant cost and is in long run equilibrium. Demand raise, but due to strict accreditation standards, new companies are not allowed to enter the market.
What is the probability of no off-the-job accidents during a one-year period (to 4 decimals)?
Consider a game in which there is a prize worth $30. There are three contes tants, A, B, and C. Each can buy a ticket worth $15 or $30 or not buy a ticket at all. Find all pure strategy Nash equilibria.
A famous hypnotist performs to a crowd of 350 students and 180 non-students. The hypnotist knows from previous experience that one half of the students and two third on the non-students are hypnotizable.
Write the Budget Constraint of the ministry as a function of the annual budget m, the km of roads x1, the added tons to the port x2, and the costs p2, b and g.
Formulate problem as a two-person, zero-sum game and use the concept of dominated strategies to determine the best strategy for each side.
If this game had only one period, what would be the effort level e and the price p in the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium?
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