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Let A and B be two sets in R2 satisfying:
Prove that there is a two-player strategic-form game satisfying the property that its set of Nash equilibrium payoffs is A, and its set of correlated equilibrium payoffs is B.
Company charges the same $5.00 price for the irmagazines. Each wants to maximize its salesgiven the$5.00price. Eachweek,therearetwopotentialcoverstories. Oneison politics.
Write a paper that uses game theory to to set up a game designed to help a consumer decide whether to buy life insurance or not.
Each player in any given match can condition her action on whether she was the first to suggest getting together. - Assume that for any given player the probability of being the first is one half. Find the ESSs of this game.
What are the limitations of the game theory approach to understanding competitive strategy
Consider a game in which there is a prize worth $30. There are three contes tants, A, B, and C. Each can buy a ticket worth $15 or $30 or not buy a ticket at all. Find all pure strategy Nash equilibria.
Write down the payoff table for this game, and find the equilibrium when the two firms move simultaneously. Write down the game tree for this game, with Coke moving first and Pepsi following.
Illustrate this game in a game table. Identify any dominant strategies in the game and solve for the Nash equilibrium.
Characterize the set of all Nash equilibria of this game.- Which Nash equilibria are perfect?- Find a proper equilibrium of the game.
Find the core of the game in which the values the legislators attach to the payoff of each bill differ from those in Figure 1 only in that legislator 3 values the passage of bill C at 0.
How many items should the merchant stock in order to maximize her expected daily profit?
Prepare a payoff table and develop a decision tree - Based on the calculated EMVs for all decision alternatives, answer the question: "Should Bill build a duplex, a quadplex, or do nothing"
Prove that if a player in an extensive-form game has only one information set, then his set of mixed strategies equals his set of behavior strategies.
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