Finding Equilibrium in Game Theory, Game Theory

This is Case of Competitive Games.

Player 2
L R
Player 1 L (60,40) (70,30)
R (65,35) (60,40)

Are either have dominant strategy? Which?
Is Solve for nash equilibrium.
Is there any other equilibrium? What is it called?
Posted Date: 11/19/2012 3:45:56 PM | Location : Germany







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