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Two people are involved in a dispute. Person 1 does not know whether person 2 is strong or weak; she assigns probability to person 2 being strong. Person 2 is fully informed. Each person can either fight or yield. Each person obtains a payoff of 0 if she yields (regardless of the other persons action) and a payoff of 1 if she fights and her opponent yields. If both people fight then their payoffs are (-1, 1) if person 2 is strong and (1,-1) if person 2 is weak. Formulate the situation as a Bayesian game and find its Bayesian equilibria if < 1/2 and if > 1/2 .
Consider the following three games (Chicken, Matching Pennies, Stag Hunt): Chicken Player 2 Player 1 D V D -100;-100 10;-10 V -10; 10 -1;-1 Matching Pennies Pla
#Dominance method#
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