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What is the Iterated Dominant Strategy Equilibrium (IDSE) and associated pay-offs?
Type your answer in the following form:
(c,B) , (6, 4)
if you think the outcome is (c,B) with pay-offs (6; 4) ; but remember the brackets, commas, upper/lower case letters, AND no spaces.
a) Show that A counting proof could be fun(?). But any old proof will do. (Note that the coefficients (1,2,1) in the above are just the elements of the second row of Pas
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