coalitional game and matching markets, Game Theory

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1. This question and the next is based on the following description.
Consider the coalitional game (referred to as Game 1) given by: N = {1,2,3,4};
v(N) = 3, v{i} = 0, i = 1,...,4, v{j,4} = 0, j = 1,2,3,
v(S) = 1 for all other coalitions S.
In Game 1,
a) players 1, 3 and 4 are substitutes.
b) players 2 is a dummy player.
c) players 1, 2 and 3 are substitutes.
d) player 4 is a dummy player.
e) None of the above.
2. In Game 1, player 1’s Shapley value is
a) 5/6.
b) 11/12.
c) 1/6.
d) 1/4.
e) None of the above.
3. In Game 1, player 4’s Shapley value is
a) 1/4.
b) 1/2.
c) 1/6.
d) 5/6.
e) None of the above.
4. Consider the two-sided matching model in which a set of three men M = {m1,m2,m3} and a set of three women W = {w1,w2,w3} have strict preferences over members of the opposite sex, given by
m1 : w2,w1,w3; w1 : m1,m3,m2
m2 : w1,w2,w3; w2 : m3,m1,m2
m3 : w1,w2,w3; w3 : m1,m2,m3.
The men ?nd all the women acceptable and the women ?nd all the men acceptable.
a) The men-proposing (M-proposing) and the women-proposing (W-proposing) Deferred Ac-ceptance Algorithms (DAAs) lead to the same core-stable matching for this example.
b) The M-proposing DAA matches m2 with w2 while the the W-proposing DAA matches m2 with w3.
c) Each of m1 and m2 strictly prefers his M-proposing match to his W-proposing match.
d) Each of w1, w2 and w3 strictly prefers her W-proposing match to her M-proposing match.
e) None of the above.
5. Consider the problem of matching a set of four students {i1,i2,i3,i4} to a set of three schools {s1,s2,s3}, where school s1 has a quota (or capacity) of 2 students each and schools s2 and s3 have a quota of 1 student each. Each student has a strict preference ranking over the schools and each school has a priority order for the students that is determined by a central authority. Each student’s preference and each school’s (strict) priority order for each student are given below
i1 : s3, s1, s2 s1 : i1, i2, i3, i4
i2 : s2, s1, s3 s2 : i1, i2, i3, i4
i3 : s1, s3, s2 s3 : i3, i1, i2, i4
i4 : s1, s2, s3
Applying the Top Trading Cycle Algorithm (TTCA) to this school choice problem leads to
a) i1 matched to s3, i2 to s1 and i3 to s4.
b) i1 matched to s3, i2 to s1 and i4 to s1.
c) i2 matched to s3, i3 to s2 and i4 to s1.
d) i1 matched to s3, i2 to s1 and i4 to s2.
e) None of the above.

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