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Consider the electoral competition game presented in Lecture 6. In this game there are two candidates who simultaneously choose policies from the real line. There is a distribution of voters with median m and the candidate whose policy is closest to the median wins the election and the winning candidate's policy is implemented. If the two candidates are an equal distance from the median, then the average of the two policies is implemented. For this problem we suppose that both candidates care about both the implemented policy and winning the election. That is, the payo to each candidate has two parts. The first part is the utility from the implemented policy a*. That is, each candidate has utility u(a* ; xi), where xi is the ideal policy of candidate i and utility decreases to the left and right of xi. We suppose that xi < m < xj . The second part is the value of winning office, which we denote wi > 0 for candidate i. Putting these two parts together, we de ne the payoff to candidate i by
Find all Nash equilibria to this game.
In econometric theory two possibie situations of identifiability can arise: Equation under,consideration is identified or not identified: 1) Equation is under-identified-
In any game, payoffs are numbers that represent the motivations of players. Payoffs might represent profit, quantity, "utility," or different continuous measures (cardinal payoffs)
You and an opponent are seated at a table, and on the table is a square board. At each of the four corners of the board, there is a disc, each one red on one side and black on the
The most basic version of a LIV allows the executive office holder (Governor or President) to accept part of a bill passed by the legislature (so that part becomes law) and to veto
The">http://www.expertsmind.com/questions/green-beard-strategy-30135520.aspx The same questions on this link.
Equilibrium payoffs are (2, 3, 2). Player A’s equilib- rium strategy is “N and then N if b follows N or N if d follows N” or “Always N.” Player B’s equilibrium strategy is “b if N
A strategy sometimes applied to repeated prisoner's dilemmas during which a player begins by cooperating however defects to cheating for a predefined amount of your time as a respo
The normal kind may be a matrix illustration of a simultaneous game. For 2 players, one is that the "row" player, and also the different, the "column" player. Every rows or column
A general term for an English auction in which there is no reserve price, guaranteeing that the object will be sold to the highest bidder regardless of the quantity of the bid.
A simultaneous game is one during which all players build choices (or choose a strategy) while not information of the methods that are being chosen by different players. Although t
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