Reference no: EM133194249 , Length: 2 pages

Question: Use IRAC and brief the 2 short cases, the cases to read are in the file below. double space, 2-3 page total.

Kelo v. City of New London, Conn.
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York Notes and Questions

Question 1. If the state pays compensation and bears the political costs, what is wrong with taking from A and giving to B? Suppose the state wants land to be used for a particular purpose. Is it sensible to require the state to conduct operations or might turning them over to private actors enhance efficiency? Or is a "public use" requirement more about policing local political processes, deterring corruption or special interest capture? If so, is this aan efficient mechanism?

Question 2. Kelo provoked a strong public reaction and a flurry of state legislative activity designed to control abuses of eminent domain. By 2009, 43 states had enacted eminent domain restrictions. Does this mean that democracy works? Are there advantages to the Supreme Court's setting limits on eminent domain? Compare Alberto B. Lopez, Revisiting Kelo and Eminent Domain's "Summer of Scrutiny", 59 ALA. L. REV. 561, 565 (2008) ("[P]ost-Kelo legislation symbolizes the government's effort to remedy the breach of the public's trust caused by Kelo regardless of one's substantive view of those legislative measures. Furthermore, the robust post-Kelo legislative response is a testament to the strength of one of the core principles of our government-federalism."), with Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2105 (2009) ("Only seven states that had recently engaged in significant numbers of economic development and blight condemnations have enacted post-Kelo legislative reforms with any real teeth."). Can one's answer be independent of one's prior views on the legitimate uses of eminent domain?

Question 3. As Justice Thomas's dissent notes, one criticism of the eminent domain power has been that it has been used in either a discriminatory or racially disproportionate manner. Which way does this consideration cut in Kelo? After all, the practice of labeling of minority communities as "blighted" is a matter of historical record. Might the Court's approval of eminent domain's use on Kelo's facts improve the politics of eminent domain law by making clear that anyone could be on the receiving end of a condemnation? And to the extent the problem with eminent domain is discriminatory application, why isn't the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause a preferable safeguard? Or does the history cited by Justice Thomas answer that question?

Question 4. Most of the affected homeowners in New London negotiated a purchase price with the New London Development Corporation (NLDC). For her part, Kelo reportedly turned down a purchase offer that would have netted her a $22,000 profit on her home. The decision to litigate, while not letting her keep her property, did lead to a higher purchase price. The public outcry in the wake of the Kelo ruling led to favorable settlements for the holdout landowners. For example,

Kelo agreed in June 2006 to sell for $442,000 ($392,000 plus a pay-off of her $50,000 mortgage); not too bad for a place she had purchased in August 1997 for $53,500, and NLDC had appraised for condemnation at $123,000 in November 2000. She only sold the lot. Avner Gregory, the same preservationist who had refurbished the house after moving it from its original location to the site where Kelo found it, relocated the house a second time to a vacant parcel with a pre-existing foundation, in a modest neighborhood several miles away, on the other side of the Amtrak rail line from Fort Trumbull. A plaque identifies the house as "The Kelo House."