Reference no: EM132202305

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ABSTRACT

As Chinese President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign continues to generate a staggering number of investigations, the institutions that conduct enforcement and the process of enforcement deserve closer examination. This article examines the People’s Procuratorate, the Commission for Disciplinary Inspection, and the Ministry of Supervision, with an emphasis on the People’s Procuratorate–the public prosecutor– and the 2014 reforms of the agency. An analysis of the process of anticorruption enforcement shows that the People’s Procuratorates have a tenuous role in supervising the Party. Following the 2014 reforms, which enhanced the capacity and investigatory powers of the People’s Procuratorates, in 2016, the Party approved limits on prosecutorial initiative in anti-corruption investigation. These reforms and subsequent retrenchment underscore the Party’s continuing control over the anti-corruption prosecutors; they also reinforce the view that China’s legal system remains formalistic and that the Party continues to operate beyond the rule of law.

I. INTRODUCTION

Beyond the staggering numbers of investigations conducted and individuals punished,1 China’s current anti-corruption campaign is a case study of institutional cooperation and competition. This article examines the process of enforcement and the institutions that undertake enforcement—the People’s Procuratorate, the Commission for Disciplinary Inspection, and the Ministry and Bureaus of Supervision—with an emphasis on the People’s Procuratorate, the public prosecutor in China. Since the late 1980s, when China embarked on a series of economic and political reforms, corruption has become prevalent, high-stakes, and large scaled.2 Bribe-taking is particularly common,3 and corrupt transactions are increasingly complex and networked.4 Given the intensification, Chinese leaders have voiced concern over corruption, acknowledging to varying degrees that corruption leads to arbitrary policies and government actions that could distort entrepreneurial decision making, reduce public confidence in government, and generate social unrest.5 Ultimately, however, their concerns focus on the detrimental effect of corruption on the legitimacy of the ruling power of the Chinese Communist Party.6 In the decades that followed, successive administrations have sought to crackdown on this conduct.7 In the current anti-corruption campaign, which began in November 2012, when Xi Jinping assumed the position of General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party,8 the Party has investigated over 500,000 Party officials for corruption-related offenses and levied punishment against over 63,000 officials.9 Over roughly the same period, the People’s Procuratorates have indicted over 120,000 officials, of which 100,200 have been convicted.10 Although the People’s Procuratorates have at times competed with the Commissions for Disciplinary Inspection, more recently, the People’s Procuratorates have acquiesced to Party control over the enforcement process. This acquiescence has consequences not only for enforcement outcomes, but also the authoritativeness and legitimacy of the enforcement process. This article argues the process of anti-corruption enforcement provides insight into the prospects of the development of rule of law in China. The recent series of reforms, including the creation of a new anticorruption unit in the People’s Procuratorates in 2014 and the curtailment of their power in 2016,11 confirms that, despite the country’s rapid legal development in the past few decades, its legal system remains formalistic, and the Party continues to exert control over criminal justice institutions and resist checks on its power. The rest of this article proceeds in three parts. Section II provides an overview of the institutions engaged in enforcement. Section III analyzes the process of enforcement and the extent to which the People’s Procuratorates compete and cooperate with the Commissions on Disciplinary Inspection. Section IV examines recent reforms of the People’s Procuratorates and their implications. II. ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTIONS China’s anti-corruption agencies and the dynamics among them should be considered in the context of an institutional arrangement that promotes the dominance of the Chinese Communist Party over the government.12 At every level, from village or township to the national level, there is a Chinese Communist Party committee and a government entity.13 At each level, the Party committee outranks the government entity.14 Consistent with this structure, there are both Party and state agencies charged with anti-corruption enforcement.15 The Commission for Disciplinary Inspection is the anti-corruption authority for the Chinese Communist Party and enforces Party rules.16 The Ministry of Supervision is the counterpart for the Chinese government, and has jurisdiction where conduct is covered by administrative law or rules.17 The People’s Procuratorate provides “legal supervision” and has jurisdiction where conduct violates criminal law.18 This section provides an overview of these institutions, beginning with and focusing on the People’s Procuratorates.

V. CONCLUSION The legitimacy and authoritativeness of anti-corruption enforcement depend not only on the punishment of illicit conduct but also on the fairness and evenhandedness of the enforcement process, as goals of detection and deterrence are balanced with the rights of defendants. This analysis of the process of anti-corruption enforcement in China shows that the People’s Procuratorates have a tenuous role in supervising the Party. After reforms that enhanced the capacity of the People’s Procuratorates and expanded its investigatory powers, the Party has sought to reassert control. The recent series of reforms affecting China’s anti-corruption prosecutors confirms that, despite the country’s rapid legal development in the past few decades, its legal system remains formalistic, and the Party continues to operate beyond the rule of law.