Determine the pure strategy nash equilibria, Game Theory

a) Define the term Nash equilibrium

b) You are given the following pay-off matrix:

 

Strategies for player 1

 

Strategies for player 2

L

C

R

T

2,0

1,1

4,2

M

3,4

1,2

2,3

B

1,3

0,2

3,0

i)   What strategies survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies?

ii) What are the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of this game?

c) A Cournot duopoly has a demand function of the form p (Q)=a-Q and faces a marginal cost C>0 where a>c . Determine the profit maximizing output for each firm and the optimal price.

d) If the two firms in (a) were to merge to form a monopoly, what would be the profit-maximizing output and the corresponding price? Compare both the output and price under Cournot and monopolist.

Posted Date: 3/8/2013 5:27:04 AM | Location : United States







Related Discussions:- Determine the pure strategy nash equilibria, Assignment Help, Ask Question on Determine the pure strategy nash equilibria, Get Answer, Expert's Help, Determine the pure strategy nash equilibria Discussions

Write discussion on Determine the pure strategy nash equilibria
Your posts are moderated
Related Questions
Discussion in the preceding section suggests that if we want to measure a given hnction belonging to a simultaneous-equations model, the hnction must be fairly stable over the samp

Identification may be established either by the examination of the specification of the structural model, or by the examination of the reduced form of the model. Traditionally

1. This question and the next is based on the following description. Consider the coalitional game (referred to as Game 1) given by: N = {1,2,3,4}; v(N) = 3, v{i} = 0, i = 1,...,4,

Equilibrium payoffs are (2, 3, 2). Player A’s equilib- rium strategy is “N and then N if b follows N or N if d follows N” or “Always N.” Player B’s equilibrium strategy is “b if N

Consider the electoral competition game presented in Lecture 6. In this game there are two candidates who simultaneously choose policies from the real line. There is a distribution

A proxy bidder represents the interests of a bidder not physically gift at the auction. Typically, the bidder can inform his proxy of the most quantity he's willing to pay, and als

consider the three player game in question 2 in assignment 1. Assume now that player 3 moves first. Players 1 and 2

(a) A player wins if she takes the total to 100 and additions of any value from 1 through 10 are allowed. Thus, if you take the sum to 89, you are guaran- teed to win; your oppone

PROBABILITY AND EXPECTED UTILITY Most students know the elementary combinatorial rules for probability algebra and need only a refresher with some exam- ples. We have used card

1. Consider two firms producing an identical product in a market where the demand is described by p = 1; 200 2Y. The corresponding cost functions are c 1 (y 1 ) = y 2 1 and c 2