Determine the pure strategy nash equilibria, Game Theory

a) Define the term Nash equilibrium

b) You are given the following pay-off matrix:

 

Strategies for player 1

 

Strategies for player 2

L

C

R

T

2,0

1,1

4,2

M

3,4

1,2

2,3

B

1,3

0,2

3,0

i)   What strategies survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies?

ii) What are the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of this game?

c) A Cournot duopoly has a demand function of the form p (Q)=a-Q and faces a marginal cost C>0 where a>c . Determine the profit maximizing output for each firm and the optimal price.

d) If the two firms in (a) were to merge to form a monopoly, what would be the profit-maximizing output and the corresponding price? Compare both the output and price under Cournot and monopolist.

Posted Date: 3/8/2013 5:27:04 AM | Location : United States







Related Discussions:- Determine the pure strategy nash equilibria, Assignment Help, Ask Question on Determine the pure strategy nash equilibria, Get Answer, Expert's Help, Determine the pure strategy nash equilibria Discussions

Write discussion on Determine the pure strategy nash equilibria
Your posts are moderated
Related Questions
Game Theory has evolved since its origins as an idea exercise for educational mathematicians. Taught in prime business faculties, economics departments, and even military academies

i have to make a tic tac toe game in matlab i dun have any idea what to do?

Consider the following three games (Chicken, Matching Pennies, Stag Hunt): Chicken Player 2 Player 1 D V D -100;-100 10;-10 V -10; 10 -1;-1 Matching Pennies Pla


Eighteenth century British mathematician who recognized a method for probabilistic mathematical inference. His Bayes Theorem, published posthumously, treats probability as a logic.

Game Theory: (prisoner's dilemma) Consider the following 2 x 2 pricing game, where rms choose whether to price High or Low simultaneously. Find the equilibrium in dominant s

A method by that players assume that the methods of their opponents are randomly chosen from some unknown stationary distribution. In every amount, a player selects her best respon

A non-credible threat may be a threat created by a player in a very Sequential Game which might not be within the best interest for the player to hold out. The hope is that the thr

Normal 0 false false false EN-US X-NONE X-NONE

Equilibrium payoffs are (2, 3, 2). Player A’s equilib- rium strategy is “N and then N if b follows N or N if d follows N” or “Always N.” Player B’s equilibrium strategy is “b if N