Cournot and Stackelberg., Game Theory

Consider two identical firms, for each firm, the total cost of producing q units of output is C(q)=0.5q^2. The price is determined as P(q1,q2)- a-q1-q2. Estimate Cournots outcome; report equilibrium quanities, profits and price.
Posted Date: 10/14/2012 8:03:22 PM | Location : United States







Related Discussions:- Cournot and Stackelberg., Assignment Help, Ask Question on Cournot and Stackelberg., Get Answer, Expert's Help, Cournot and Stackelberg. Discussions

Write discussion on Cournot and Stackelberg.
Your posts are moderated
Related Questions
A type of trigger strategy sometimes applied to the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma during which a player responds in one amount with identical action her opponent utilized in the last

Write two methods for the mouse trap game (using your board created in Assignment 3) and an event handler (another method) to test the two methods. 1. world.raise(item) where

A sub game excellent Nash equilibrium is an equilibrium such that players' methods represent a Nash equilibrium in each sub game of the initial game. it should be found by backward

A heuristic is an aid to learning, casually brought up as a rule of thumb. Formally, a heuristic may be a mechanism capable of altering its internal model of the surroundings in re


Perfect Nash equilibrium Two students prepare their homework assignment together for a course. They both enjoy getting high grade for their assignment, but they dislike workin

Discussion in the preceding section suggests that if we want to measure a given hnction belonging to a simultaneous-equations model, the hnction must be fairly stable over the samp

A payoff offerd as a bequest for someone partaking in some activity that doesn't directly provide her with profit. Often, such incentives are given to beat the ethical hazard drawb

Consider the following three games (Chicken, Matching Pennies, Stag Hunt): Chicken Player 2 Player 1 D V D -100;-100 10;-10 V -10; 10 -1;-1 Matching Pennies Pla

Stanley is auctioning an item that he values at zero. Betty and Billy, the two potential buyers, each have independent private values which are drawn from a uniform distribution, P