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Two people are involved in a dispute. Person 1 does not know whether person 2 is strong or weak; she assigns probability to person 2 being strong. Person 2 is fully informed. Each person can either fight or yield. Each person obtains a payoff of 0 if she yields (regardless of the other persons action) and a payoff of 1 if she fights and her opponent yields. If both people fight then their payoffs are (-1, 1) if person 2 is strong and (1,-1) if person 2 is weak. Formulate the situation as a Bayesian game and find its Bayesian equilibria if < 1/2 and if > 1/2 .
The strategic (or normal) kind may be a matrix illustration of a simultaneous game. for 2 players, one is that the "row" player, and also the different, the "column" player. every
consider the three player game in question 2 in assignment 1. Assume now that player 3 moves first. Players 1 and 2
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write a program in c that takes n number finite players using gambit format and output is to be all pure strategy nash equilibrium
Any participant in a very game who (i) contains a nontrivial set of methods (more than one) and (ii) Selects among the methods primarily based on payoffs. If a player is non
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