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A strategy is weakly dominant if, no matter what the other players do, the strategy earns a player a payoff a minimum of as high as the other strategy, and, the strategy earns a strictly higher payoff for a few profiles of different players' methods. Hence, a method is weakly dominant if it's invariably a minimum of nearly as good as the other strategy, for any profile of different players' actions, and is strictly higher for a few profile of others' methods. If a player contains a weakly dominant strategy, than all others are weakly dominated. If a method is usually strictly higher than all different for all profiles of other players' methods, than it's strictly dominant.
(a) Equilibrium payoffs are (1, 0). Player A’s equilibrium strategy is S; B’s equilibrium strategy is “t if N.” For (a): Player A has two strategies: (1) N or (2) S. P
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