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Scenario
Two corporations should simultaneously elect a technology to use for his or her compatible merchandise. If the corporations adopt totally different standards, few sales result. a {standard|a typical} standard ends up in higher sales. One technology is considerably most well-liked by customers over the opposite. Thus, if the businesses will standardize on the well-liked technology, every obtains maximal profits.
Description
There are 2 pure strategy equilibria. Each corporations like identical equilibrium that Pareto dominates the opposite. A Mixed strategy equilibrium conjointly exists.
Example
Firm 2
good
bad
Firm 1
5,5
0,0
3,3
General Form
Player 2
L
R
Player 1
U
a,w
b,x
D
c,y
d,z
Where the following relations hold: a>d>b; a>d>c w>z>y; w>z>x
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