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GAME 3 Bargaining
Two players A and B are chosen. Player A offers a split of a dollar (whole dimes only). If B agrees, both get paid the agreed coins and the game is over. If B refuses, it is B’s turn but now the sum is only 80 cents. If A accepts B’s offer, the two get paid the agreed coins. If A refuses, the game is over and neither gets anything.
Do this five times in succession with different pairs and the second-round totals falling successively to 70, 60, 50, and 40 cents. Keep a record of the successive outcomes.Again hold a brief discussion. The aim is to get the students to start thinking about rollback and subgame perfectness and,if the students understand these strategies but still don’t play them, why they don’t. Also, consider how the discrepancy changes with the second-round fraction.
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