Reference no: EM133346750

Kantian Ethics and the Problem of Moral Luck

Discussion Introduction:

On Kant's view, the results of our actions are morally irrelevant because the moral worth of actions is only to be found in the autonomous willing of the act.4 But it is this feature that leads the Kantian view to deny the existence of moral luck - cases where the morality of an action seems to depend on factors outside of our control. Here are some common examples of moral luck: (1) an otherwise good parent shaking their baby, and (2) an otherwise good driver succumbing to negligent driving. If the baby dies due to the shaking, we may judge this parent quite severely. If the driver's negligence results in the death of an innocent pedestrian, we may judge this driver quite severely. But notice that we don't usually make similar judgments of such parents or drivers if the bad consequences don't occur (i.e., the shaking doesn't harm the baby, or the negligent driving doesn't result in a pedestrian's death). We usually treat the unlucky case differently from the lucky case despite the fact that the behavior in both cases was exactly the same.

Discussion Prompt:

What do you think about the idea of moral luck? Are we perhaps holding a moral double standard in the above cases - letting the lucky parent/driver off the moral hook while holding the unlucky parent/driver to a harsher standard? Should we perhaps remove this double standard by either being less harsh on the unlucky parent/driver or more severe with the lucky parent/driver? Or do you think-contra Kant's view-that such a double-standard is actually justified? Use the original post to defend the answer to these questions, using the parent or the driver example.