Reference no: EM131053236

Please respond to the following post with a short response:

Ladonna posts-

The key actors in the decision making to go to Iraq were George Bush and part of his administrations immediately after 9/11 happened. Secretary of Defense Pual Wolfowitz strongly favored going after Saddam Hussien. Wolfowitz thought it would be easier than going to Afghanistan. Bush decided to sign a secret contract to go to war with both countries because he felt the country could not handle the news. The exclusion of some actors did affect the decision I think because Bush ultimately knew he wanted to go to war when it happened and I think him signing a "secret plan" just proves he didn't want to hear what other who opposed the war thought. He was going to make the final decision. The professional careerist and political appointies failed because Bush did'nt want to hear it! Colin Powell argued that we would lose our rightful place as the good guy and the coalition backing the US wouldn't hold if we turned to go to war with Iraq, The CIA director and Chief of Staff agreed, but the bottom line is Bush didn't care he made up his mind and the war with Iraq was inevitable.

Jamesposts -

This week's discussion is very personal for me. I watched this bit of political maneuvering from the viewpoint of a young Sergeant in the Infantry, hoping that George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, and Donald Rumsfeld were wrong so that I wouldn't have to put my Soldiers in harm's way. When Secretary of State Colin Powell made his case to the UN Security Council, he convinced me too and my attitude changed from apprehension to anger and a desire to unleash my Soldiers on an enemy intent on our destruction. Some of the other voices I was listening too included Condoleezza Rice, Hans Blix, Ahmad Chalabi, James Baker, Norman Schwartzkopf, Barry McCaffrey, and Brent Scowcroft. The latter set made a great case for restraint, but it didn't seem to be working. I remember the feeling of inevitability as the deadline approached.

It almost seemed as though the pro-war group of Bush, Cheney, Wolfowitz, and Rumsfeld were just not going to listen to anyone who was against the war. This included CIA analysts and leaders, DoD officials, the President's own National Security Advisor, and even the most senior Generals and Admirals in the military. Colin Powell in particular, seemed to be cut out of the decision-making process during the buildup to war, despite his obvious qualifications as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the first Gulf War and his position in the inner Cabinet as the Secretary of State. Conversely, the pro-war group decided to listen to Ahmad Chalabi, despite his obvious bias. The reading doesn't allow a reader to draw a definitive conclusion about the inclusion or exclusion of certain parties, but it certainly suggested that Bush, et. al., just didn't want to listen to a dissenting viewpoint.

Many of the professional careerists and political appointees who opposed the war did so with carefully worded internal memos and "leaks" to the press. The chief executive and his most trusted advisors were clearly trying to build consensus for war and the dissenters didn't seem to want to put their career or position on the line in opposition. The CIA was visited repeatedly by the Vice President and his aide. This public pressure appears to have produced a National Intelligence Estimate that favored the hawks, despite the lack of evidence and the failure of Hans Blix and his team to find proof of WMD in Iraq. The environment of intimidation and coercion felt oppressive then and hasn't lessened with time.

The management of the war by political appointees and professional careerists in Iraq is an even more painful example of just how disastrous decisions by public administrators can be (disbanding of Iraq's military, self-centered view of American Soldiers as "liberators", shoot it if it moves rules of engagement, etc.). A topic for another day, perhaps.