Reference no: EM131706104

The Goodrich A7-D Brake Case

This case is one that is very often used as an example in engineering ethics texts, especially to study whistle-blowing. In studying this case, it is important to keep in mind that much of the information presented here is derived from the writing of the whistle-blower. An individual who is deeply embroiled in a controversial situation such as this one will have different insights and viewpoints on the situation than will management or other workers. Little is publicly known about what Goodrich management thought about this case.

In the 1960s, the B. F. Goodrich Corporation was a major defense contractor. One of their main defense-related industries was the production of brakes and wheels for military aircraft. This activity was located in Troy, Ohio. Goodrich had developed a new and innovative design: a four-rotor brake that would be considerably lighter than the more traditional fi ve-rotor designs. Any reduction in weight is very attractive in aircraft design, since it allows for an increase in payload weight with no decrease in performance.

In June of 1967, Goodrich was awarded the contract to supply the brakes for the A7-D by LTV, the prime contractor for the airplane. The qualifying of this new design was on a very tight schedule imposed by the Air Force. The new brake had to be ready for flight testing by June of 1968, leaving only one year to test and qualify the design. To qualify the design for the flight test, Goodrich had to demonstrate that it performed well in a series of tests specified by the Air Force.

After the design had been completed, John Warren, the design engineer, handed the project over to Searle Lawson, who was just out of engineering school, to perform the testing of the brakes. Warren moved on to other projects within the corporation. Lawson's first task was to test various potential brake-lining materials to see which ones would work best in this new design. This test would be followed by the testing of the chosen linings on full-scale prototypes of the brakes. Unfortunately, after six months of testing, Lawson was unable to fi nd any materials that worked adequately. He became convinced that the design itself was fl awed and would never perform according to the Air Force's specifications.

Lawson spoke with Warren about these problems. Warren still felt that the brake design was adequate and made several suggestions to Lawson regarding new lining materials that might improve performance. However, none of these suggestions worked and the brakes still failed to pass the initial tests. Lawson then spoke about these problems with Robert Sink, the A7-D project manager at Goodrich. Sink asked Lawson to keep trying some more linings and expressed confidence that the design would work correctly.

In March of 1968, Goodrich began testing the full brake prototypes. After 13 tests, the brake had yet to pass the Air Force's specification for temperature. The only way to get the brakes to pass the test was to set up cooling fans directed at the rotors. Obviously, brakes that required extra cooling would not meet the Air Force's specification. Nevertheless, Sink assured LTV that the brake development was going well.

Kermit Vandivier was a technical writer for Goodrich who was responsible for writing test reports and was assigned to write the report for the new A7-D brakes. This report would be an integral part of the Air Force's decision-making process. Vandivier was not an engineer, but he did have experience in writing up the results of this type of test. In the course of writing the report on the A7-D brake tests, Vandivier became aware that some of the test results had been rigged to meet the Air Force's specifications. Vandivier raised his concerns about the report he was writing, feeling that he couldn't write a report based on falsified data. His attempts to write a n accurate report were not allowed by management, and Goodrich submitted a report using the jury-rigged data. Based on this report, the brake was qualifi ed for flight testing.
Vandivier was concerned about the safety of the brake and wondered what his legal responsibility might be. He contacted his attorney, who suggested that he and Lawson might be guilty of conspiracy to commit fraud and advised Vandivier to meet with the U.S. Attorney in Dayton. Upon advice of the U.S. Attorney, both Lawson and Vandivier contacted the FBI.

In July, the Air Force asked Goodrich to supply the raw test data for review. This request led to efforts at Goodrich to control the damage that would ensue when the real nature of the tests became known. Not being satisfied with the report presented to it, the Air Force refused to accept the brake. Knowing that the four-rotor brake was not going to work, Goodrich began an effort to design a five-rotor replacement. Vandivier continued meeting with the FBI and supplied FBI agents with Goodrich documents related to the A7-D brake tests.
Apparently, Lawson had impressed LTV because after the flight testing was over, LTV offered him a job. Lawson accepted and left Goodrich on October 11, 1968. With the only other person who really knew about the test procedures gone, Vandivier also decided to resign from Goodrich. In his letter of resignation, he included a series of accusations of wrongdoing against Goodrich regarding the brake tests. Vandivier went to work for the Troy Daily News, the local newspaper.

At the Daily News, Vandivier told his editor about the situation at Goodrich. From there, the story made its way to Washington, where it came to the attention of Senator William Proxmire, among others. In May of 1969, Proxmire requested that the General Accounting Office (GAO) review the issue of the qualifi cation testing of the A7-D brakes. The GAO investigation led to an August 1969 Senate hearing chaired by Proxmire. By then, the new fi ve-rotor brake had been tested and qualified for use on the A7-D. At the hearing, Vandivier's concerns and the GAO findings were publicly aired. The GAO report confirmed Vandivier's statements about testing discrepancies, though the report also showed that there was no additional cost to the government in obtaining a working brake and that the brake problems didn't cause any substantial delays in the overall A-7D program.

No official action was taken against Goodrich as a result of this incident, and there does not seem to have been any negative impact on the careers of those at Goodrich involved in the A7-D project. Lawson went on to a successful career at LTV. Vandivier later wrote a chapter of a book and an article in Harper's magazine detailing his version of the story.

Questions:

1. Was an unethical act taking place when test results on the brake were falsified? Explain your answer

2. Was this mitigated by the fact that the brake design was a new one for which the old test methods might not be applicable? This was a claim by Goodrich. If the old test methods were not applicable to the new design, what should Goodrich have done?

3. Can some of the problems here be attributable to sloppy management? For example, should the original designer be allowed to hand off the test work to a new hire with no further participation? What are the ethical implications of this type of management?

4. What could Goodrich have done to solve the problem without public disclosure of the falsified tests? (Use an event tree and mathematical formula to justify your answer)