Perfect nash equilibrium, Game Theory

Perfect Nash equilibrium

Two students prepare their homework assignment together for a course. They both enjoy getting high grade for their assignment, but they dislike working on the assignment. They can both choose to supply Low, Medium or High level of effort. Their payoff is given in the table below:

 

2411_perfect Nash equilibrium.png

(a) Find all pure-strategy Nash equilibria of this game. Can the efficient outcome be achieved in equilibrium in a one-shot game?

(b) In this course students have to hand in two assignments. Thus, the above game is played twice. Start by assuming that students are very patient (no discounting between the periods). Is there a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium that can achieve the outcome M-M in the first stage? If yes, describe this equilibrium, otherwise explain why it is not possible. Hint: discuss whether we have a problem with credible threats here.

(c) How does your answer in part (b) change if we now assume very impatient students with δ= 0:3? Provide both calculations and intuition.

Posted Date: 2/15/2013 6:53:22 AM | Location : United States







Related Discussions:- Perfect nash equilibrium, Assignment Help, Ask Question on Perfect nash equilibrium, Get Answer, Expert's Help, Perfect nash equilibrium Discussions

Write discussion on Perfect nash equilibrium
Your posts are moderated
Related Questions
GAME 4 Auctioning a Penny Jar (Winner’s Curse) Show a jar of pennies; pass it around so each student can have a closer look and form an estimate of the contents. Show the stud

A collection of colluding bidders. Ring members comply with rig bids by agreeing to not bid against one another, either by avoiding the auction or by putting phony (phantom) bids

In Bontemps, Louisiana there are only two places to spend time: Merlotte's bar and Fangtasia. Sookie and Eric have made plans to spend Friday night together, but they never decided

Scenario Two conspirators are arrested and interrogated separately. If one implicates the opposite, he might go free whereas the opposite receives a life sentence. Yet, if each

Any participant in a very game who (i)  contains a nontrivial set of methods (more than one) and (ii) Selects among the methods primarily based on payoffs. If a player is non

a) Define the term Nash equilibrium b) You are given the following pay-off matrix:   Strategies for player 1   Strategies for player 2

GAME 5 All-Pay Acution of $10 Everyone plays. Show the students a $10 bill, and announce that it is the prize; the known value of the prize guarantees that there is no winer’s

a) This you just have to list all the attributes for the program. i.e. unique id's for puzzle pieces, attributes for the puzzle like a data field for the number of edges, methods t

A bidding increment is defined by the auctioneer as the least amount above the previous bid that a new bid must be in order to be adequate to the auctioneer. For example, if the in