Game of chicken, Game Theory

Scenario

Two hooligans with one thing to prove drive at one another on a slender road. the primary to swerve loses faces among his peers. If neither swerves, however, a terminal fate plagues each.

Description

There are 2 pure strategy equilibria within the game of chicken (or chicken game). a unique pure strategy equilibrium is most well-liked by every player. each equilibria are Pareto optimal. A mixed strategy equilibrium conjointly exists.

 

Posted Date: 7/21/2012 4:00:38 AM | Location : United States







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