English auction, Game Theory

 

A type of sequential second worth auction during which an auctioneer directs participants to beat the present, standing bid. New bids should increase the present bid by a predefined increment. The auction ends when no participant is willing to outbid the present standing bid. Then, the participant who placed the present bid is that the winner and pays the number bid. A second worth auction is additionally called a Vickrey Auction when William Vickrey who initial described it and found out that bidders have a dominant strategy to bid their true values. Whereas the very best bidder pays the number bid, an English auction is termed second-price since the winning bidder would like solely outbid following highest bidder by the minimum increment. therefore the winner, effectively, pays an quantity equal to (slightly higher than) the second highest bid.

 

Posted Date: 7/21/2012 3:53:21 AM | Location : United States







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