Button auction, Game Theory

 

A form of a Japanese auction (which is a form of an English auction) in which bidders hold down a button as the auctioneer frequently increases the current price. Bidders irrevocably free the button when the current price surpasses their willingness to pay. The auction close when only one bidder remains and all others have released the button.

 

Posted Date: 7/21/2012 5:29:58 AM | Location : United States







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