Reference no: EM132234609
Briefly summarize the element and the case study associated with the element
Employee Participation Organizations should plan the PSM effort, and plans should include the scope of the effort, roles and responsibilities, reporting requirements, hazard analysis approaches, document control processes, and hazard control strategies. As part of the PSM effort, employers must consult with employees and their representatives to ensure that all parties understand the hazards and risks in the process. In particular, employees must have access to the process hazard analysis and information used to support that analysis. Without participation of employees risks may not be fully understood or appropriately communicated.
Case Study: Fire in Texas On February 16, 2007, a fire occurred at a refinery near Sunray, Texas. The fire caused extensive damage to the facility and led to the facility being shut down for months. Four people were injured by the accident. The cause of the accident was a cracked pipe that leaked liquid propane. The pipe that cracked was in a section of piping that had not been used in 15 years. The piping was not properly isolated (an isolation valve leaked). The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) noted in its accident investigation report that water had accumulated in the low portion of the pipe and froze during cold weather cracking the pipe. When the outside temperatures warmed the propane expanded and vented out of the crack, ultimately igniting. The fire was likely made worse by the inability of the operator to shut off flow of propane to the pipe – remotely operated valves had not been installed. 3 The CSB faulted the refinery’s freeze protection processes and its hazard analysis process. The CSB identified several aspects of the hazard analysis that led to the failure to identify conditions leading to the accident. The CSB stated that the hazard analysis failed to identify the potential for a “dead leg” that could be subject to freezing, and did not identify the need for remotely operated valves. In addition, the CSB stated that the hazard analysis was performed by a contractor and did not involve the operators of the facility. This failure to involve the personnel running the facility may have led to the failure to uncover these hazards. The CSB also noted that no hazard tracking process existed to follow up on recommendations made as part of the hazard analysis process.