Universalizability and reversibility

The clear-cut imperative incorporates two criteria for determining moral right and wrong: universalizability and reversibility. Universalizability means, person's reasons for acting must be reasons that everyone could act on at least in principle. Reversibility means, the person's reasons for acting should be reasons that he or she would be willing to have all others use, even as a source of how they treat him or her. That is, one's reasons for acting must be reasons that everyone could act upon in belief, and the person's reasons must be such that he would be willing to have all others use them as well. Contrasting utilitarianism, which focuses on consequences, Kantian theory emphasizes on interior motivations.

The second formulation Kant gives of the definite imperative is this: "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end." Or never care for people only as means, but always also as ends. Kant means by "treating humanity as an end" is that everyone should care for each human being as a being whose existence as a free rational person should be promoted. For Kant, this means two things:

(a) Develop each person's capacity to freely choose for him or herself the aims he or she will pursue. Kant's second version of the categorical imperative can be expressed in the following principle:

"An action is morally right for a person if, and only if, in performing the action, the person does not use others merely as a means for advancing his or her own interests, but also both respects and develops their capacity to choose freely for themselves."

 (b) Respect each person's freedom by treating people only as they have freely consented to be treated beforehand.

This edition of the categorical imperative implies that human beings have an equal dignity that sets them distant from things such as tools or machines and that is incompatible with their being deceived,  manipulated  or  otherwise  unwillingly  exploited  to  satisfy  the  self-interests  of another.

Though, even if the categorical imperative explains why people have moral rights, it cannot by itself tell us what particular moral rights humans have. And when rights come into conflict, it cannot tell us which right should take precedence. Still, there seem to be three basic rights that can be defended on Kantian grounds:

1.   Humans have a clear interest in being provided with the work, food, clothing, housing, and medical care they need to live.

2.   Humans have a clear interest in preserving the institution of contracts.

3.   Humans have a clear interest in being free from injury and in being free to live and think as they choose.

Regardless of the attractiveness of Kant's theory, critics have argued that, like utilitarianism, it has its drawbacks and inadequacies. A first problem that critics have traditionally pointed out is that Kant's theory is not accurate enough to always be useful. Second, some critics claim that although we might be able to agree on the types of interests that have the status of moral rights, there is considerable disagreement concerning what the limits of each of these rights are and about how each of these rights should be balanced against other conflicting rights. A third group of criticisms that have been prepared of Kant's theory is that there are counterexamples that show the theory at times goes wrong. Most counterexamples to Kant's theory focus on the  criteria of universalizability and reversibility.

A very unusual view of rights is based on the work of libertarian philosophers such as Robert Nozick. They claim that freedom from restraint is necessarily good, and that all constraints imposed on one by others are needed evils, except when they prevent even greater human constraints. The only basic right we all own is the negative right to be free from the coercion of other human beings.

Libertarians may pass too quickly over the fact that the liberty of one person necessarily imposes restrictions on other persons, if only those others must be constrained from interfering with that person. If I have the right to unionize, for instance, I confine the rights of my employer to treat me as he sees fit. Though libertarians tend to use Kant to support their thoughts, there is no consensus on whether or not this is actually possible. There is also no good ground to assume that an only negative right prevails.

Justice and Fairness

The quarrel over "brown lung" disease caused by cotton dust shows how references to justice and fairness saturate such concerns. Justice and fairness are fundamentally comparative. They are concerned with the proportional treatment given to the members of a group when benefits and burdens are dispersed, when members of a group cooperate or compete with each other, when rules and laws are administered and when people are punished for the wrongs they have done or compensated for the wrongs they have undergone. Justice generally refers to matters that are graver than fairness, though some philosophers maintain that fairness is more essential. In general, we think that considerations of justice are more imperative than utilitarian concerns: greater benefits for some do not rationalize injustices to others. However, standards of justice not generally supersede individual moral rights. This is probably because justice to some extent is based on individual moral rights.

There are three categories of issues involving justice:

1.   Distributive justice is concerned with the fair distribution of society's benefits and burdens.

2.   Compensatory justice is concerned with compensating people for what they lose when harmed by others.

3.   Retributive justice refers to the just imposition of penalties and punishments

Queries of distributive justice arise when there is a scarcity of benefits or a excess of burdens; not enough food or health care, for case or too much unpleasant work. When resources are in short supply, we must develop principles to allocate them fairly. The fundamental principle involved is that equals should be treated equally and unequals treated unequally. However, it is not lucid in just what respects people must be equal. The primary principle of distributive justice may be articulated as follows:

"Individuals who are similar in all respects relevant to the kind of treatment in question should be given similar benefits and burdens, even if they are dissimilar in other irrelevant respects; and individuals who are dissimilar in a relevant respect ought to be treated dissimilarly, in proportion to their dissimilarity."

Egalitarians hold that there are no appropriate differences among people that can justify unequal treatment. According to the egalitarian, all benefits and burdens should be dispersed according to the following formula:

"Every  person  should  be  given  exactly  equal  shares  of  a  society's  or  a  group's benefits and burdens."

Despite the fact that equality is an attractive social ideal for many, egalitarianism has been powerfully opposed. Some critics claim that ability, need and effort are all relevant differences among people, and that it would be unfair to ignore these differences.