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Imagine that a zealous prosecutor (P) has accused a defendant (D) of committing a crime. Suppose that the trial involves evidence production by both parties and that by producing evidence, a litigant increases the probability of winning the trial.
Specifically, suppose that the probability that the defendant wins is given by eD>(eD + eP), where eD is the expenditure on evidence production by the defendant and eP is the expenditure on evidence production by the prosecutor. Assume that eD and eP are greater than or equal to 0. The defendant must pay 8 if he is found guilty, whereas he pays 0 if he is found innocent. The prosecutor receives 8 if she wins and 0 if she loses the case.
(a) Represent this game in normal form.
(b) Write the first-order condition and derive the best-response function for each player.
(c) Find the Nash equilibrium of this game. What is the probability that the defendant wins in equilibrium.
(d) Is this outcome efficient? Why?
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Pertaining to the matrix need simple and short answers, Find (a) the strategies of the firm (b) where will the firm end up in the matrix equilibrium (c) whether the firm face the prisoner’s dilemma.
Show that in order that AA and PP yield a player the same expected payoff when her opponent uses the strategy β, we need β to assign probability (V + v)/2c to AA.
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Formulate this situation as a strategic game and find all its mixed strategy equilibria. (First argue that in every equilibrium B assigns probability zero to the action of allocating one division to each pass.
Consider an infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game with values of δ sufficiently close to (but not equal to) 0. Which of the following are true - Nash equilibrium in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game without discounting
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