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Question: Suppose that two players, Bob and John, play the following matrix game.
Part a: Find all of the game's pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Now suppose that the players play this game twice in a row. They observe what each other did in the first stage before they decide what to do in the second stage. Each player's payoff is the (undiscounted) sum of his payoffs in the first and second stages.
Part b: Find all Subgame Nash Equilibria of this finitely repeated game.
Part c: Why may it be possible to support non-equilibrium outcomes in a stage game when the game is repeated a finite number of times.
Part d: Why might it be possible to support cooperation in an infinitely-repeated
Write a program to check out how good my new random number generator generates numbers. A good generator produces evenly distributed numbers over some range. determine how well these numbers are dispersed between 1 and 100.
After collecting appropriate data, you find that 1148 customers chose to "Be A Glutton". Compute P-value and determine the conclusion of the test.
Let x, y, a, b be positive numbers. - Find the set of Nash equilibria of this game.- Find the set of correlated equilibria of this game.
The following hypothetical data demonstrate the relationship. The dependent variable is a measure of language skill at age 3 for each child. Do the data indicate any significant differences? Test with α=0.05.
Can you find an equilibrium at which every buyer i wins with probability αi, for any collection of nonnegative numbers α1, α2,...,αn whose sum is 1?
Two players, Amy and Beth, take turns choosing numbers; Amy goes first. On her turn, a player may choose any number between 1 and 10 Who will win the game? What are the optimal strategies (complete plans of action) for each player?
Construct a 90% confidence interval for the population average weight of the candies.
Does each firm have a dominant strategy? If so, explain and what that strategy is and what is the Nash equilibrium? Explain where the Nash equilibrium occurs in the payoff matrix.
Find all mixed-strategy Nash equilibria and solve for all Nash equilibria and provide a justification for players' preferences over each of these equilibria.
What is the number of subgames in a game whose game tree has eight vertices and one information set, which contains two vertices?
Prove that the bargaining set is covariant under strategic equivalence. In other words, if (N; v) and (N; w) are two coalitional games with the same set of players.
However, when I run "./random2 1 100 20" for example it seg faults after displaying largest number and smallest number without displaying mean and median.
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