Trigger strategy, Game Theory

 

 A strategy sometimes applied to repeated prisoner's dilemmas during which a player begins by cooperating however defects to cheating for a predefined amount of your time as a response to a defection by the opponent (trigger). These might vary from the less harsh Tit for Tat to the severe Grim Trigger Strategy.

 

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