Solve for the bayesian nash equilibrium, Game Theory

Consider the Cournot duopoly model in which two rms, 1 and 2, simultaneously choose the quantities they will sell in the market, q1 and q2. The price each receives for each unity given these quantities is P(q1; q2) = a b(q1 + q2). Suppose that each rm has probability  of having unit costs of cL and (1 - μ) of having unit costs of cH, where cH > cL. Solve for the Bayesian Nash equilibrium.

 

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