Prisoners'' dilemma scenario, Game Theory

Scenario

Two conspirators are arrested and interrogated separately. If one implicates the opposite, he might go free whereas the opposite receives a life sentence. Yet, if each confess, dangerous fate befalls them. If each keep silent, insufficient proof can lead them being charged with and convicted of a lesser crime.

Description

Each player contains a dominant strategy. The ensuing equilibrium is Pareto dominated by an alternate outcome during which every player plays the dominated strategy.

Example



Prisoner 2



deny

confess

Prisoner 1

deny

2,2

0,3

confess

3,0

1,1

General Form



Player 2



L

R

Player 1

U

a,w

b,x

D

c,y

d,z

Where the following relations hold:
c>a>d>b 
x>w>z>y 

 

Posted Date: 7/21/2012 5:01:25 AM | Location : United States







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