Principal agent, Game Theory

 

A class of games of imperfect data during which one player (the principal) tries to supply incentives to the opposite (the agent) to encourage the agent to act within the principal's best interest. Often, such incentives are given to beat the ethical hazard drawback during which the agent has inadequate incentives to perform.

 

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