Japanese auction, Game Theory

 

A type of sequential second worth auction, just like an English auction during which an auctioneer frequently raises the present worth. Participants should signal at each worth level their willingness to remain within the auction and pay the present worth. Thus, not like an English auction, every participant should bid at every level to remain within the auction. The auction concludes when just one bidder indicates his willingness to remain in. This auction format is additionally called the button auction.

 

Posted Date: 7/21/2012 4:30:14 AM | Location : United States







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