Implications of the identification state of a model, Game Theory

Identification is closely related to the estimation of the model.

If an equation is identified, its coefficient can, in general, be statistically estimated. In particular:

(a) If the equation is exactly identified, the appropriate method to be used for its estimation is the method of indirect least squares.

(b) If the equation is over-identified, indirect least squares cannot be applied, because it will not yield unique estimates of the structural parameters. There are various other methods which can be used in this case, for example two-stage least squares (2SLS), or maximum likelihood methods.

Posted Date: 4/4/2013 3:11:58 AM | Location : United States

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