Hawk-dove game , Game Theory

 

Scenario

The hawk-dove game is additionally commonly called the sport of chicken. 2 hooligans with one thing to prove drive at one another on a slender road. The primary to swerve loses faces among his peers. If neither swerves, however, a terminal fate plagues each. Within the hawk-dove version of the story, hooligans are replaced by armies considering attending to war.

Description

There are 2 pure strategy equilibria. a unique pure strategy equilibrium is most well-liked by every player. each equilibria are Pareto optimal. A mixed strategy equilibrium conjointly exists.

Example



Driver 2



stay

swerve

Driver 1

stay

-100,-100

1,-1

swerve

-1,1

0,0

General Form



Player 2



L

R

Player 1

U

a,w

b,x

D

c,y

d,z

Where the following relations hold:
b>d>c>a 
y>z>x>w 

 

Posted Date: 7/21/2012 4:25:13 AM | Location : United States







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