Game playing in class:adding numbers—win at 100, Game Theory

GAME PLAYING IN CLASS GAME 1 Adding Numbers—Win at 100

This game is described in Exercise 3.7a. In this version, two players take turns choosing a number between 1 and 10 (inclusive), and a cumulative total of their choices is kept. The player to take the total exactly to 100 is the winner.The first pair starts by choosing numbers more or less at  taking the total successively to 12, 23, . . ., 78, 89, 100. You can hold a brief discussion and build this insight into the general idea of backward induction. You can also point out how the equilibrium strategy is a complete plan of action.

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