Game playing in class-equilibrium payoffs example, Game Theory

(a) Equilibrium payoffs are (1, 0). Player A’s equilibrium strategy is S; B’s equilibrium strategy is “t if N.”

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For (a): Player A has two strategies: (1) N or (2) S. Player B has two strategies: (1) “t if N” or (2) “b if N.”

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