Game playing in class-equilibrium payoffs are (4, 5), Game Theory

Equilibrium payoffs are (4, 5). Player A’s equilibrium strategy is “S then S if n and then N if n again.” Player B’s equilibrium strategy is “n if S and then n if S again and then s if S again.”

 

 

1386_GAME PLAYING IN CLASS-Equilibrium payoffs are (4, 5).jpg

 

 

For(c):

Player A has four strategies:

(1) N,

(2) “S and N if n,”

(3) “S and S if n and N if n again,” or

(4) “S  and S if n and S if n again.”

Player B has four strategies:

(1) “s if S,”

(2) “n if S and s if S again,”

(3) “n if S and n if S again and s if S again,” or

(4) “n if S and n if S again and n if S again.”

Posted Date: 9/27/2012 2:37:48 AM | Location : United States







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