Game playing in class-equilibrium payoffs are (2, 3, 2), Game Theory

Equilibrium payoffs are (2, 3, 2). Player A’s equilib- rium strategy is “N and then N if b follows N or N if d follows N” or “Always N.” Player B’s equilibrium strategy is “b if N” (or just b). Player C’s equilibrium strategy is “d if S” (or just d).

 

 

972_GAME PLAYING IN CLASS-Equilibrium payoffs are (2, 3, 2).jpg

 

For(b):

Player A has eight strategies:

(1) “N and N if b or N if d,”

(2) “N and N if b or S if d,”

(3) “N and S ,if b or N if d,”

(4) “N and S if b or S if d,”

(5) “S and
N if b or N if d,”

(6) “S and N if b or S if d,”

(7) “S and S if b or N if d,” or

(8) “S and S if b or S if d.”

 

Player B has two strategies:

(1) “t if N,”

(2) “b if N.”

Posted Date: 9/27/2012 2:34:45 AM | Location : United States







Related Discussions:- Game playing in class-equilibrium payoffs are (2, 3, 2), Assignment Help, Ask Question on Game playing in class-equilibrium payoffs are (2, 3, 2), Get Answer, Expert's Help, Game playing in class-equilibrium payoffs are (2, 3, 2) Discussions

Write discussion on Game playing in class-equilibrium payoffs are (2, 3, 2)
Your posts are moderated
Related Questions
Tower defense - is a subgenre of real-time strategy games. The goal of tower defense games is to try to stop enemies from crossing a map by building towers which shoot at them as t

Any participant in a very game who (i)  contains a nontrivial set of methods (more than one) and (ii) Selects among the methods primarily based on payoffs. If a player is non

Players 1 and 2 are bargaining over how to split one dollar. Both players simultaneously name shares they would like to keep s 1 and s 2 . Furthermore, players' choices have to be

. A bid is an sign by a potential buyer of the price the buyer is ready to pay for the object being auctioned. In a Procurement Auction, the bid is an sign of the price a seller is

A bidding increment is defined by the auctioneer as the least amount above the previous bid that a new bid must be in order to be adequate to the auctioneer. For example, if the in


Rollback equilibrium       (b) In the rollback equilibrium, A and B vote For while C and D vote Against; this leads to payoffs of (3, 4, 3, 4). The complete equil

Two people are involved in a dispute. Person 1 does not know whether person 2 is strong or weak; she assigns probability to person 2 being strong. Person 2 is fully informed. Each

Computer Game Zenda This game was invented by James Andreoni and Hal Varian; see their article, "Pre-Play Contracting in the Prisoners 'Dilemma".The paper also contains some co

Consider the electoral competition game presented in Lecture 6. In this game there are two candidates who simultaneously choose policies from the real line. There is a distribution