Find the nash equilibria of game - bimatrix of strategies, Game Theory

Players 1 and 2 are bargaining over how to split one dollar. Both players simultaneously name shares they would like to keep s1 and s2. Furthermore, players' choices have to be in increments of 25 cents, that is, s1 ? {0, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 1.00} and s2 ? {0, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 1.00}. If s1+s2 < 1, then player 1 gets s1 and player 2 gets s2. If s1+s2 > 1, then both players get 0.

(1) Write down the normal form of the game (the bimatrix of strategies and payoffs).

(2) Find the Nash Equilibria of this game.

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