2 bidders have identical valuations of an object for sale. The value of the object is either 0; 50 or 100, with equal probabilities. The object is allocated to one of the bidders in a second price (Vickrey) auction: the highest bidder gets the object and pays the second highest bid.
In case of a tie the object goes to bidder 1. Bidder 1 gets the signal 1 where T_{1}(0) = l; T_{1}(50) = m and T_{1}(100) = h. Bidder 2 gets the signal T_{2} where T_{2}(0) = L and T_{2}(50) = T_{2}(100) = H.
(i) Find a Nash equilibrium of this auction.
(ii) What is the seller's revenue? Could the seller get a higher revenue if bidder 2 had better information? Explain.