fighting for survival, Game Theory

Two animals are fighting over a prey. The prey is worth v to each animal. The cost of fighting is c1 for the first animal (player 1) and c2 for the second animal (player 2). If they both act aggressively (hawkish) and get into a fight, they split the prey in two equal parts but suffer the cost of fighting. If both act peacefully (dovish) then they also split the prey in two equal parts but without incurring any cost. If one acts dovish and the other hawkish, there is no fight and the hawkish gets the prey.
(2.1) Write down the normal form of the game (the bimatrix of strategies and payoffs).
(2.2) Find the Nash Equilibria for all possible parameter configurations and given the following restrictions: v > 0, c1 > c2 > 0, v ?= 2c1 and v ?= 2c2.
Posted Date: 10/15/2012 6:52:04 AM | Location : United States







Related Discussions:- fighting for survival, Assignment Help, Ask Question on fighting for survival, Get Answer, Expert's Help, fighting for survival Discussions

Write discussion on fighting for survival
Your posts are moderated
Related Questions
QUESTION ONE. (a) The probability that, a bomber hits a target on a bombing mission is 0.70 Three bombers are sent to bomb a particular target. (i)  What is the probabilit

Tower defense - is a subgenre of real-time strategy games. The goal of tower defense games is to try to stop enemies from crossing a map by building towers which shoot at them as t

Not technically an auction, however a posted-price procedure during which the auctioneer sets a worth and sells to the primary bidder willing to pay it. The auction ends as soon as

Scenario To determine who is needed to try to to the nightly chores, 2 youngsters simultaneously build one among 3 symbols with their fists - a rock, paper, or scissors. straigh

A multiunit auction that during which within which  each winning bidder pays a unique worth which depends on the particular bid placed by every winning participant. Alternatively,

Consider two identical firms, for each firm, the total cost of producing q units of output is C(q)=0.5q^2. The price is determined as P(q1,q2)- a-q1-q2. Estimate Cournots outcome;


Players 1 and 2 are bargaining over how to split one dollar. Both players simultaneously name shares they would like to keep s 1 and s 2 . Furthermore, players' choices have to be

Game Theory: (prisoner's dilemma) Consider the following 2 x 2 pricing game, where rms choose whether to price High or Low simultaneously. Find the equilibrium in dominant s

In a positive add game, the combined payoffs of all players aren't identical in each outcome of the sport. This differs from constant add (or zero add) games during which all outco